Melay V. Abao
Social Movements Program
Institute for Popular Democracy
This article is not about the “Black and White Movement”. I agree, in fact, with the black and white movement’s standpoint that when it comes to acknowledging the electoral fraud committed by GMA, there is no space for the “grey”. What i want to comment on in this article is the idea or the tendency to look at the resolution to our political crisis in terms of “black and white”. With several ouster attempts rendered unsuccessful (i.e calls for GMA’s resignation, impeachment, lack of people power, etc) and with coup rumors now abuzz, there seems to be a “message in the air” (for lack of a better term) that only a coup d’etat can bring about change - that to condemn a coup attempt, in fact, is to defend GMA. In other words, there is that message that “there is no other alternative”. Black. Or White.
Should I then be apologetic if I hold the position that yes, I want GMA out but I am not supportive of mutinous means to oust her? Does this make me “grey” (i.e in political terms, I assume grey means I am either confused or naïve).
One can argue that dramatic change happens, as it has happened in our country twice (1986, 2001), only through mutinous events. Edsa 1 was essentially a coup d’etat that was later upstaged by people power. Edsa 2 started with people power that became successful only when the military withdrew support from the Estrada regime. In these two events, the role of the military in the change process could not/cannot be understated.
But should a military takeover happen again, now? Should the military take center stage in the change process again, now? Should we be “excited” at all about the possibility of another military takeover that will finally oust GMA and finish off this prolonged crisis?
The past 20 years have made me think that the manner by which change happens directly affects the actual outcome. When I think of the past two decades and the past two dramatic EDSAs, I cannot help but think that in fact not much has changed. If a mutiny is indeed “it”, and we’ve had two, why has change (i.e positive change) not happened at all?
I do not want to negate the relevance of the two previous EDSAs or the centrality of the role of the military in these events. I merely want to question the wisdom of having another mutiny as a solution, now. The nagging thought in my mind is that perhaps, after twenty years and two mutinies, we should have learned our lesson that another mutiny will not bring about substantial change. A mutiny, after all, is essentially a power grab of a select few. At this point, maybe the lesson for us is that a power grab is simply not the answer. And perhaps, meaningful change is not achieved through out-of-the-ordinary events, rather, through the grueling process of actually getting people to believe in the purposes of change and the need to act to make this change happen.
Others may also argue that given a “progressive wing” among the military rebels, there are real “spaces for reform” in a military-led post-GMA transition (or a civilian-led transition after a military takeover). But then again, for many of us in the democratic Left, especially the “unarmed” Left, discerning spaces for reform is not a matter of conjunctural analysis, rather, a matter of ideological standpoint – i.e., we will always find those spaces for reform and struggle for reform no matter what the political landscape or the balance of forces looks like. Is it not true, infact, that some of our colleagues in the progressive movement (i.e who are now anti-GMA) used to think that there were spaces for reform under the GMA government? Or spaces for reform under the Estrada government for that matter? This line of argumentation about “spaces for reform” cannot convince me that this “progressive wing” among the military rebels will be any different from Estrada or GMA.
In my opinion, at this conjuncture, to learn from the EDSAs is to “rethink” the EDSAs, not to repeat them. And in re-thinking, we may need to re-define our conception of “power” – its definition, its uses, the means of achieving it, its dangers. For what were all the EDSAs but changes in the balance and configuration of power? Another mutiny is bound to change the current balance of power but will it re-distribute power? Will it finally empower the Filipino people? Or will it simply redound to another round of compromises between the successful mutineers and their cohorts – or produce yet another unmanageable alliance between strange bedfellows?
I am afraid that many of us in the Left still look at power in terms of black and white – i.e., either one is “in” power or “out” of power. Wielding power is about getting “in there”. The general conception is that one has to seize power, that is, state power.
I have no problem with having a state agenda because it is the state that manages the political process. And a democratic, activist state has always been our collective aspiration – a state that will redistribute political and economic power.
But perhaps, we need to rethink the nuances of that collective aspiration. Perhaps, a state, even with the Left at the helm, will not be able to re-distribute power if the people in the first place are not empowered to demand the same. Perhaps, wielding power does not start or end with taking over the state.
A mutiny might indeed topple down GMA. It might even produce a TRG. But I am afraid it will not produce the TRG in our minds – the TRG that will empower people and bring about system change. In all likelihood, a mutiny will again leave the majority of our people in the sidelines. I cannot imagine how one can steer system change without a significant social and political base demanding and supporting such kind of change. To borrow the words of a colleague of mine, any military or civilian-military junta will likely have an “SWS constituency” behind it, not an “actual” social or political support base.
I am now reminded of a definition I read somewhere that power is not about “taking or holding” power but “participating in every pertinent discourse”. This definition tells me that there is always an alternative and therefore I need not choose only between black and white — I need not limit my choices on simply defending either the mutineers or GMA. It prods me to be unapologetic for being in the “grey”. Feb 22, 2006
Uploaded 23 February 2006.
@2003 Institute for Popular Democracy
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